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"The Transatlantic Civilizational Arc of Christianity" – a New Geostrategic Concept for the 21st Century Order of Civilizations

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Abstract: *Within this paper, we'll explore some hypothesis and perspectives about the evolutions of the complex contemporary international system, influenced by political vision of what we call "the neo-realist strategic direction". We'll take into account a complex, multi-level kind of political doctrine, not yet fully explored and analysed by the academic world. We'll propose in this paper the strategic concept of "building a Transatlantic Arc of Christianity", as a necessary modality to respond to specific challenges originating from what it is announcing to become "the paradigm of the century" ("the clash between civilisations" paradigm). Neo-realist elements of this strategic line impose such approach and also, there are shaping relevant strategic concepts, appropriated to be implemented within this type of paradigm.*

Keywords: *paradigm of civilizations, order of civilizations, Eurasian Arc of Christianity, Transatlantic Arc of Christianity, countering Islamic terrorism, Trump doctrine, clash of civilizations.*

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A shifting international order, from the perspective of the "Clash of Civilizations" paradigm

The present article[1] attempts to provide a few comments on the *existence of a common strategic nationalist and Christian-civilizational thinking,* over the bridge of time, between a Christian-Orthodox hierarch, from the East-European space (Miron Cristea, the first Patriarch of the unified Romania, after the proclamation of the Great Union, on December 1st 1918) and the vision of the new Trump administration, 100 years later, on the US, paying a strategic attention *to the increase and strengthening of the role of nation-states* at the beginning of the 21st century, *to the reconstruction of a neo-Westphalian order*, based on the consolidated concept of nation-state, as a strategic alternative to globalism.

Focusing on the nationalist paradigm ("*America First*") and developing a clear economic nationalist direction, in our opinion, the new Trump administration *created a complex type of doctrine, which is yet to be deciphered by the international scholars, and analysed thoroughly by experts (at present, this doctrine being instead treated superficially, if not ironically, maliciously).* Numerous analyses of Trump's strategic thinking have been published; however, *many of them do not take a serious and thorough approach to the strategic themes and concepts*, stated by the Trump administration. Instead, they continue to use media clichés, which are negative in most cases.

However, in our opinion, Trump's political doctrine is real, *it is multidimensional, it's shaping (far from being in its final form), and it requires an in-depth analysis.*

This article will cover some of the *strategic points which were not sufficiently analysed by the media or by the scholars, being ignored (which does not mean they will not be fully followed and consolidating strategic directions).* One of these strategic directions included in the Trump Doctrine, which we discovered in various public materials (speeches, press interviews, press releases etc.) of the Trump administration or dating back to the election campaign, is *a clear focus on the civilizational paradigm (or "clash of civilizations").*

[1] This article explores some theoretical perspectives and scenarios about the evolution of international system at the beginning of XXIst century and it represents a personal viewpoint of the author, based on the analysis and interpretation of information and documents from public sources available (in 2018). The present article represents only the personal opinion of the author and it does not involve in any form any other natural person or legal entity. All the rights over the present text are reserved. The quotations of the present text can be made by mentioning the author and the complete source.

This paradigm is not seen exclusively as a "paradigm of conflict", although Trump's speeches may leave the audience with this impression. There are elements which support applying the paradigm in *an inclusive sense, i.e. for dialogue, tolerance, cooperation among the people, understanding* the diversity of civilizational domains, their specificity, observing their traditions. To put the Trump doctrine in a dichotomist light *ab initio*, seeing it as "a doctrine oriented exclusively to a conflictual relationship with opposing civilizations" (such as the Islam) would be an error. *However, the Trump doctrine is facing great geostrategic challenges, which it has to know how to handle.*

The diplomatic vision of the Patriarch Miron Cristea: strengthening relations among european christian countries; a strategic cooperation between Romania and Poland, two countries traditionnaly defending european christianity

Miron Cristea (1868–1939) was the first Patriarch of the Romanian Orthodox Church, of the reunited Great Romania (being elected on February 4th 1925 and instated on November 1st 1925). He was an honorary member of the Romanian Academy, starting June 7th 1919. He held the highest positions in the state administration, being a High Regent (July 20th 1927 – June 8th 1930) during the dynastic crisis, and President of the Council of Ministers (February 10th 1938 – March 6th 1939) (Romanian Academy, Department of Historic and Archaeologic Sciences, & Platon, G. (Coord.). (2003). He was elected Bishop of Caransebeș on November 21st/December 3rd 1909, and he was invested on April 25th/May 8th 1910. As a Bishop, he participated to the Great National Assembly in Alba Iulia, on December 1st 1918 (Dindirică, 2011) and he was a member of the Delegation of Romanians from Transylvania, who presented the Deed of Unification between Transylvania and Romania, in Bucharest. On December 18th 1919, he was elected Metropolitan-Primate of the Unified Romania, being invested and installed the following day.

Here a few of his many achievements: he founded the Skete of Saint John the Baptist on the bank of Jordan, in 1935; he built a Romanian community in Jerusalem, in 1935, which included a church, a home for the pilgrims, on a plot obtained from the Palestinian government) (Dindirică, 2011); he founded the Academy of Religious Music, the Bible Institute of Bucharest, several theological seminaries in Romania. He also founded and blessed several churches both in Romania, and in Vârşeţ (Serbia), Sofia (Bulgaria). Miron Cristea donated important amounts of money to charities and cultural organizations, in order to strengthen the Christian and national identity, and also for the commemoration of Romanian heroes,

organizations such as the Society of Christian-Orthodox Women in Romania, the Society for the Graves of Heroes Fallen in the Ist World War, the Society for Protection of War Orphans etc. He also provided a large number of scholarships to young Romanian theologians and intellectuals.

Miron Cristea was the initiator of the architectural project for the Romanian People's Salvation Cathedral, monument dedicated to the Romanian heroes fallen in the Independence War (1877-1878) and in the First World War, for the independence and creation of the Romanian unified state (Dindirică, 2011).

He worked to reunite all the Orthodox churches in an Ecumenical Synod (idea he resumed in 1938), built the current Patriarchal Palace of Bucharest, and founded a Missionary Episcopacy in America, based on the Law passed on May 5th 1934.

On January 24th 1935, Policarp Moruşca was elected *Bishop of the Orthodox Romanians in America.* He was installed as a Bishop at the Saint George Cathedral in Detroit (Dindirică, 2011), on July 4th 1935. The necessity to found such Episcopacy in America stemmed from the fact that over 300,000 Orthodox Romanians lived at that time in the USA and in the Dominion of Canada, with 100,000 Romanians, in the South American countries (Serviciul Arhivelor Istorice Centrale, n.d.). The Missionary Episcopacy of America, founded by Patriarch Miron Cristea, was led by a hierarch with the rank of Metropolitan (Serviciul Arhivelor Istorice Centrale, n.d.).

In a letter to Patriarch Miron Cristea, dated February 5th 1936, the Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie, considered Cristea to be "*the greatest patriarch of Orthodoxy*" (Brezeanu, 2005) and considered that Miron Cristea was "*now – after the fall of the Russian empire – de facto, if not the jure the head of the Oriental Orthodox Church*" (Dindirică, 2011). After 1918, The Romanian Orthodox Church had the largest number of parishioners in the world, after the Russian Orthodox Church (which was faced, at that moment, with a precarious situation, after the Bolsheviks assumed power, leading a policy hostile to the church) (Dindirică, 2011).

In 1921, Miron Cristea was keeping correspondence with the Western Christian churches, such as Randall T. Davidson, the Archbishop of Canterbury. The same year, the Bishop of Gibraltar, John Gireg, was visiting the Romanian Orthodox Church. In 1923, other two English hierarchs, Bishop Charles Gore and Harold Buxton, visited Bucharest, being welcomed by Miron Cristea (Dindirică, 2011). Nugent Hicks, the new Bishop of Gibraltar arrived at Bucharest in 1927, and in 1930. Bilateral contacts were created between the Romanian Orthodox Church and the Anglican Church (Dindirică, 2011).

Both as the high hierarch of the Romanian Orthodox Church and as a state man, Miron Cristea worked to build *a diplomacy of cooperation and closeness among the neighbouring European Balkan states and other states from the Christian civilizational area, in order to strengthen the amicable relationships with the sister-churches in Eastern Christian-Orthodox churches, building thus, a geostrategic line of so-called "civilizational diplomacy"*. He contributed *to shaping an "area of Christian civilization" in Europe, as well as outside Europe (starting diplomatic relations of cooperation with the Christian-Orthodox churches from the Middle East, and even founding a Christian-Orthodox Episcopacy in North America, in 1934).*

Using the tools specific to the "church diplomacy" (reuniting assemblies of the hierarchs from the sister-Chirstian Orthodox churches; gathering assemblies of the high hierarchs from the Eastern Orthodox churches, as "synods"), Miron Cristea pursued the religious, theological and diplomatic objectives to create a coherent and strongly structured Christian civilizational area in Europe. These objectives envisaged the following: creating a "*dogmatic and spiritual unit, which we desire to support with the strength of our worthiest predecessors, with all the Orthodox churches in the areas with Orthodox people*" (Cristea, 1923a), resuming the "*so long interrupted line of counsels in synods, with all the countries and peoples who confess their apostolic Eastern Orthodox faith*" (Cristea, 1923a). Facilitating an "*ecumenical assembly of the Orthodox churches from all over the world in the near future seems more possible than before, as well as more necessary*", since "*the World War of the last years has turned the Orthodox nations into national states and countries*" (Cristea, 1923a), he stated in one of his Speeches.

Miron Cristea was preoccupied with *strengthening the political and diplomatic relations, based on belonging to the common culture (European Christian), with the countries neighbouring Romania, including Poland.* In May 1938, he made a three-day official visit to Poland (Dindirică, 2011). The visit of the Romanian Patriarch to a Christian state such as Poland was part of a greater diplomatic approach initiated by the Romanian state, which was interested in obtaining political support from Great Britain and France, as the two countries had guaranteed Poland's borders (Dindirică, 2011). The Romanian state was also interested in developing diplomatic relations of cooperation and support with the Christian churches in the European area (Dindirică, 2011). Accompanied by Metropolitan Visarion Puiu of Bucovina, and by priest Grigore Antal, the Patriarch of Romania Miron Cristea visited civilian institutions, as well as theological and religious institutions, such as the Palace and the Metropolitan Cathedral from Warsaw, the theological seminary, the theological dorm, as well as cities such as Krakow and Lwow (Dindirică, 2011).

Miron Cristea was the first Patriarch of Romania who paid an official visit to Poland, visit *which strengthened the diplomatic and theological relations based on belonging to a common Christian identity, between the two countries*. A notable aspect is the fact that this visit took place in the context in which Miron Cristea, as the Metropolitan-Primate of Romania, *actively supported the acknowledgement of the Polish Church by the Ecumenical Patriarchy of Constantinople, in 1924* (Dindirică, 2011).

On September 13th 1925, as Miron Cristea mentioned in his memoir, "two Metropolitans of Poland (Joachim of Chalcedon and Germanos of Sardeon), together with other Polish officials from the Polish Ministry of External Affairs (Cristea, 1999) arrived in Bucharest" *and received the support of the Romanian Orthodox Church, represented by Miron Cristea as Metropolitan-Primate of Romania, to declare the autonomy of the Polish Orthodox Church in Warsaw* (church organized following the indications given by Miron Cristea to the Polish Prime Minister, when the latter visited Bucharest especially for this purpose) (Cristea, 1999).

As a sign of respect and acknowledgment of the Romanian Orthodox Church's importance for the European Christian area, the Romanian Orthodox Church was raised to the rank of Patriarchy, in 1925 (Dindirică, 2011), as a symbol of the indisputable success of the church diplomacy, under Miron Cristea, after the proclamation of the unified Romania. When Miron Cristea was invested with the rank of Patriarch, on November 1st 1925, "*all the foreign plenipotentiary ministers attended, with the French minister as the guest of honour. Dolci, the papal nuncio, arrived after the investiture. So did the Hungarian one. I shook everyone's hand and thanked them*" (Cristea, 1999) recounts Miron Cristea in his Memoirs. High hierarchs from the entire Christian civilizational area attended his investiture ceremony. Thus, all the Eastern churches (Cristea, 1999) were represented by: delegates of the Patriarch of Constantinople, Ioachim – Metropolitan of Chalcedon; a delegate from Jerusalem – Metropolitan Dositeos of Sebastia; Greece was represented by Metropolitan Policarp of Tritia and Archimandrite Constantinidis; Serbia was represented by Bishop Emilian of Timoc and Archimandrite Nikolits; Bulgaria was represented by the Neophyte Metropolitan of Vidin, while Poland was represented by Dionisie, Metropolitan of Poland from Warsaw, who "*gave me the white kamelaukion, and the President of the Republic, the 'Order of Polonia Restituta', because I instructed the Polish Minister in Bucharest on how to organize the Polish Orthodox Church with its five million parishioners, to be autonomous*" (Cristea, 1999), as recounted by Miron Cristea in his Memoirs.

The Church of Russia was represented at Miron Cristea's investiture by Antonie, the famous former Metropolitan of Kiev, who lived in Karlovitz (Serbia). Miron Cristea's Memoirs describe the ceremony: "*after we all took our seats, it was inspiring to see how everyone gathered in the name of their church, under the protection of the Romanian Patriarchy, the one called to revive Orthodoxy everywhere*" (Cristea, 1999).

Among others, the new Patriarch was preoccupied with founding and blessing churches, including churches in Serbia and Bulgaria, and with founding the Episcopacy in America. "*I have always insisted on founding it. The Synod declared it founded in 1921, the Missionary Episcopacy. The Americans the same (…). In 1929, they keep insisting. They proclaim me – Miron – Bishop of the Orthodox Romanians from the United States of America, and they ask me to lead them by proxy*" (Cristea, 1999).

In 1934, after receiving the approval from the king, and from the Romanian government, Patriarch Miron Cristea summoned the Holy Synod and adopted a law by which "*a Missionary Episcopacy is founded for the Orthodox Romanians from the Western non-Orthodox countries, under the canonical jurisdiction of the Holy Synod*". The law was subsequently approved by the Romanian Senate, on April 26th 1934, and by the Chamber of Deputies, on April 28th 1934 (Cristea, 1999).

During his activity as a Patriarch, the hierarch promoted *a close partnership between the church and the state,* which he saw to be necessary for the Romanian state in order to maintain the sense of belonging to the same people, as well as the national identity and the role of civilizational actor in the Christian-European area. Miron Cristea was an active supporter of *the idea of solidarity among the Christian peoples,* of creating *a "Christian axis" of the states in Central and South-Eastern Europe*, able to ensure proper resistance against certain forms of complex ideological and civilizational challenges of his time, particularly after the fall of the Russian empire, in 1917. In his view, Eastern Christianity was the underlying factor for the geostrategic consolidation of *an area of resistance and affirmation of the Christian, historic, civilizational identity*, emblematic for the entire Europe.

Current elements and possible developments of the Trump doctrine, from the perspective of the "Civilizational Paradigm"

Decades later, we find surprising similarities between the 20 century diplomatic approach developed by the Patriarch and stateman Miron Cristea (to *create a well-shaped Christian civilizational area,* through the identity of religion and traditions), and some elements of the Trump Doctrine, regarding the

approach to the "clash of civilizations" paradigm, at the beginning of the 21st century.

Currently, the Trump Doctrine encompasses certain clear geostrategic elements (defined and assumed in official speeches, and statements of the Trump administration):

- It acts strategically (which includes re-using multilateralism, as well as the neo-realist "clash of civilizations" paradigm, for reorganization of the world *based on the model of multiple civilizations, with different identities* -as alternatives to globalism, which is considered a factor weakening the nation-state and the economic power of America, in particular-). *Particular focus is placed on the "clash of civilizations" paradigm (a clear element of neo-realism detected in Trump's Doctrine)*, starting with the election speeches, through the firm and repeated instances in which a stand is taken against radical Islamism, through the anti-immigration policy, through announcing certain objectives as "major objectives" of the security policy and external affairs of the United States: *"countering Islamic terrorism", countering nuclear proliferation (Iran, North Korea)* (Parameswaran, 2016), *which are civilizational areas different from that of Christianity, from the standpoint of the "clash of civilizations" paradigm).*

- *It turns the major objective of the security policy and external affairs of the US ("countering Islamic terrorism") into a true global objective*[2] (which entails "intervention anywhere on the globe, for this purpose") – maybe, as the *only* element of globalism (Parameswaran, 2016) which remains certain in the content of Trump's Doctrine. In Trump's Doctrine, Jihadism falls under the "*greater immediate threat*" category, which shows that the "clash of civilizations" paradigm has already been assumed and it is being implemented.

- *It "responds to the unpredictable"and "adapting to the unpredictable"*, to the changing order of the 21st century. This is another objective of the Trump Doctrine and, in this view, it requires the following: reconfiguration of NATO, as a 21st century alliance (transforming it from the "alliance of the bipolar period" into a "*civilizational* alliance"), mainly focused on countering asymmetrical, unconventional threats, which come from the non-Christian, non-Western civilizational areas ("*on fighting terrorism, NATO can and should do more. Fighting terrorism is the top national security priority for the United States, as it should be for all of us*") (Tillerson, 2017).

[2] "*Defeating ISIS and other radical Islamic terror* ***groups will be our highest priority***. *To defeat and destroy these* ***groups****, we will pursue* ***aggressive joint and coalition*** *military operations* ***when necessary***". https://2017-2021.state.gov/america-first-foreign-policy/

- An external policy, guided by the "*America first*" (Parameswaran, 2016) adage, as the main strategic pillar. This adage repositions the entire American external policy around the concept of "*national interest*", which is however interpreted differently by the doctrine ("national interest" as "a strict interest in reconsolidating America *internally, from the economic standpoint* (Parameswaran, 2016), in particular", as "*economic nationalism*"; or, on the contrary, "the national interest" of the USA would be that of *continuing to support* the *global network* of partnerships and agreements inherited from the previous administrations, and that of continuing to define itself as a *global* power). In the third scenario, "national interest" could mean *a pragmatic, supple and flexible approach, where* ***certain*** partnerships and agreements from the former global network of the USA are reused, and reconverted into elements of pragmatic, strategic repositioning, which matches the priorities set by the Trump administration.

- The Trump Doctrine which, from the very start, seemed to be a doctrine based mainly on *the security approach*, identifies *several types of dangers – classic and asymmetrical–, all related to non-Christian, non-Western civilizational areas* (jihadism, waves of immigrants from non-Western areas, North Korea, Iran etc.) (Sanger & Haberman, 2016) defined as "the greatest threats against the US security".

- The Trump Doctrine *strengthens the civilizational axis of the Christian peoples in Europe* (The White House, 2017). (an *implicit* strategic objective, given that "countering jihadism" (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018) is now a *priority* of the US external and security policy). This would also entail that the strategic partnerships with NATO member states from "the Christian area" are *encompassed in a new type of partnership*, something as "a Greater *Civilizational Christian* Partnership" (GCCP) with the US, fulfilling a clear and coherent set of strategic objectives, specific to the "*Christian civilizational area defenders*" (Sanger & Haberman, 2016). It is not a matter of "abandoning NATO" (Sanger & Haberman, 2016), but a matter of *improving the flexibility of this organization, by* adding a new pillar (through a SDP/ Strategic Declaration of Priorities, with a clear set of strategic objectives), matching the security interests of the countries in the Christian civilizational area, facing the *civilizational aggressions*. Using the classic multilateral framework of NATO (as a traditional Westphalian alliance -"nation-states against classic dangers generated by other nation-states"-)[3], a *limited strategic partnership* (such as US-

[3] A feature compatible between NATO (as the Westphalian alliance of the nation-states) and the Trump doctrine (which supports the increased role of the nation-states on the international scene, and which promotes abandoning globalism, especially from the economic standpoint, which favoured multinational companies and weakened the states).

Romania-Poland, for example) can be initiated, through bilateral and multilateral strategic relations with NATO countries, belonging to the "Christian-European geostrategic area". Such a partnership would be able to fulfil *the strategic security objectives of the Christian civilizational area*, with the US as the dominant power (from the perspective of its obligation "to act responsibly and promptly", in a "clash of civilizations" paradigm). The clear neo-realist perspective of Trump's Doctrine inevitably leads it to act *within the paradigm* of "war among civilizations", where the strategic partners, the major strategic objectives, the priorities, the institutional actions, methods are *insufficiently shaped* at the moment, at least.

- The Trump Doctrine initiates an alliance of the Christian states of the world[4] ("*defending the American way of life*" concept, corroborated with the *"America first"* concept and both being interpretable as "*America, leader of the Christian civilizational area", "The dominant civilizational power of this particular area"*) (Sanger & Haberman, 2016). The geostrategic concept of "*America first*", which is used repetitively and with a central role in the Trump Doctrine, hides deep civilizational meanings (*from the viewpoint of the "clash of civilizations" paradigm). "America first"* is used *not only* in its obvious, explicit sense (as pure "economic nationalism"), but also in a hidden, civilizational-symbolic sense (as "*Roma Aurea*", "*caput mundi*", "centre of the Christian world"), in the sense of "capital of the Caesars/of the leaders" (Brezeanu, 2005), i.e. as the *geostrategic,* military and civilizational centre of the "*Republica Christiana*", which takes on the role to represent, to save (from the decadence born from postmodernity) and to reunite the Christian-civilizational area, from the *strategic and defensive* standpoint. Hence *a direct civilizational connection* between "*America first*" and "*Pax Christiana*", which highlights the main strategic role of "Defender and Protector of Transatlantic Christianity" to be taken on by the US (as "*civilizational power*"[5], which controls this geostrategic space of the 21st century world). *Pax*

[4] Starting by interpreting in a deep sense (and corroborating with political discourses of President Trump, such as in Poland/2017) (Trump White House, 2017), the strategic concept of"***defending the American way of life***" (pillar I, USA National Security Strategy, December 2017). How the Trump administration does see this concept? We'll need to look at the Trump political program and to his vision, and see the attention given to stimulate, preserve and enforce the traditional American identity, the " profound, true, real America" that he defended against all odds and that gave him political credit until the level of becoming the US President.

[5] In the sense of a "political actor in an order of civilizations", according to the paradigm of "war among civilizations", where only *civilizational areas* with clear, strongly shaped identities can resist and/or become dominant, from the geopolitical standpoint.

Christiana becomes a force-idea of the New (civilizational) *Protection,* ensured by new types of alliances (by "civilizational alliances", adjusted to the 21st century world) or through the fundamental reorganization of the existing alliances (such as NATO, for example).

- The Trump Doctrine builds a *type of Christian Transatlantic Partnership/CTP* (based on the religious-spiritual dimension), especially with countries from the Central and South-Eastern Europe, such as Romania and Poland, seen as "strategic partners of the US". In other words, it focuses on *Europe's returning to its Christian origins*, as a source of its civilizational power; it helps an estranged, secularized, post-Christian Europe, at the beginning of the 21st century, to regain its soul. *From a strategic and civilizational standpoint, the Trump Doctrine promotes Europe's return to the source of its civilizational power.* We are considering that "the postmodern EU" cannot be seen as "a pillar of the US global civilizational strategy", in a genuine clash of civilizations, neither in a reorganization of the world from a geopolitical-civilizational standpoint, *if Europe does not regain a clear civilizational identity (which can only be the original, Christian identity, based on times where which Europe was a global power).* In other words, the Trump Doctrine does not consider "postmodern Europe/EU" to be capable of successfully hold the fort against identity (religious, in this case) pressure coming from other civilizational areas. *This "postmodern Europe" is in danger of disappearing,* which would have an impact on US's position as "civilizational leader" in this clash of civilizations. In a *civilizational order,* it is essential for the Trump Doctrine that Europe can be capable of holding the fort by recovering its lost civilizational (Christian) identity. *In a civilizational order, the decision-makers are only the great civilizations.* Based on this logic, *only political structures with strong and clear civilizational identities can survive.* America's interest *in a civilizational order* is that of not having to cope with the impact/pressure of great civilizational areas, not only non-Western, but also non-Christian, with religious identities which are simply different, all by itself. US true isolation (a security risk) would not stem from the "America first" paradigm (seen by some as a "lonely America, focused on itself, therefore vulnerable"), *but from EU's separation as a political entity* (the US's pillar for the Christian-European civilizational area) *from its natural, Christian roots*, which have helped it to cope with migratory and opposing identity pressures, along history. In the order of civilizations, *the major security risk* faced by the US (as a dominant power in this war of civilizations) is the risk of not being able to control, neither eliminate Europe's separation from the source of its civilizational historic power (the traditional Christian identity),that is the loss of a source of historic power. Therefore, the strategic option adopted by the US is *to built the New Europe* (through

"*civilizational partnerships*" with countries from the Central and South-Eastern Europe, with assumed and present Christian identities).

- The Trump Doctrine *activates a clear interventionist-punitive dimension* (by countering Islamic terrorism, Islamic radicalism, anywhere on the planet), as an approach *firmly and repeatedly* expressed by President Trump in his speeches (Sanger & Haberman, 2016). It is clearly *a global dimension*, maybe the only one left from the previous globalist doctrines, which defined US contemporary role in the world. This approach can even re-define NATO's *traditional role* (as an alliance *of states* with a defensive role *against other states*), towards an increase in the importance of the *non-conventional*, civilizational side (for example, "*countering Islamism*" (Arhweiler, 2002) – as non-state, asymmetrical and civilizational actor-).

- The Trump Doctrine initiates a *firm and clear* civilizational dimension*, focusing on re-aggregating the US and restructuring its strategic partnerships, around a religious-Christian identity concept*), for example through the anti-immigration policies, which particularly envisage categories of immigrants coming from areas with non-Western and/or non-Christian identities (The White House, 2017).

- The Trump Doctrine initiates a *symbolic "Washington-Warsaw-Bucharest" civilizational axis* (a symbolic axis of a Transatlantic Christian Civilizational Area/TCCA, on which *states from the Central and South-Eastern Europe*, such as Romania and Poland, as traditional defenders of the Christian identity, *now become strategic points from the Eastern end of Europe*).

Building the "Transatlantic Arc of Christianity"/TAC – a new major geostrategic element in the Trump doctrine. What type of geostrategic relationship with the "Eurasian Arc of Christianity"/EAC?

In the 21st century, a century during which *civilizations* rather than states tend to become the main actors to reorganize the world from the geopolitical standpoint, *the Trump Doctrine encompasses new paths and interesting elements, to provide new perspectives on America's role in the shaping international world.*

Thus, in our opinion, the Trump Doctrine includes elements favouring the following strategic lines (from the perspective of the "clash of civilizations" paradigm):

- *Initiating a CTP/Civilizational Transatlantic Partnership* (in which the main element is represented by *strategic partnerships with the European states which have national, historic, Christian identities*, and which have stood out *throughout history* as defenders of the Christian civilizational area). Based on these elements, countries such as Romania or Poland are favoured by a re-

capitalization of the current network of strategic partnerships with the US (partnerships in which *the identity-religious dimension* is starting to be relevant, as a cohesive element of a future GCAC/ *Global Civilizational Arc of Christianity*), an ample geostrategic concept, which is taking shape. The Global Arc of Christianity is not regarded as an objective to expand the Christian values "everywhere in the world" (similar to the values of democracy, through the use of the "global leader" role, currently held by the US). Instead, it is a strategic concept which envisages *the revitalization* of the "identity-civilizational" component (of belonging to the *oikoumēnē*, "the spiritual community of Christians"[6]) of *certain strategic partnerships of the US, already in place* in Europe (which would consolidate America's role of "leading power in the Christian civilizational area"). We do note, however, that *a strategic-civilizational rivalry is taking shape* between powers such as the US and Russia, *regarding the leadership in the new civilizational order*. Both the United States (through the Trump Doctrine) and Russia take on the role of "identity-civilizational leaders", for the same geostrategic area (that of "Christianity"). If Russia develops *a clear role* as "the leader of a civilizational mega-structure", in which it is the promoter of Christian values for the EAC/Eurasian Arc of Christianity, within the Eurasian supra-entity (as a concept central to the Russia's Eurasian doctrine), the US are not without option in this civilizational game. Thus, the US are re-positioning already existing strategic partnerships (which are currently little or poorly understood in the doctrine, and which fail to be analysed in-depth), *by pursuing an identity-civilizational criterion* (that of "assuming the *role of proxy for the Christian area")*. Thus, for Europe, the civilizational profile is one *divided between* an area of affirming the Christian civilizational profile (states from the Central and South-Eastern Europe, particularly Romania and Poland) and a post-Christian, postmodern, Western area of Europe (the latter is, in our opinion, *a buffer* zone between two very clearly drawn geostrategic-civilizational Arcs – the Eurasian Arc of Christianity, dominated by Russia, and the Transatlantic Arc of Christianity, dominated by the US).

- From the civilizational standpoint, in an international order under reconfiguration, at the beginning of the 21st century, *the postmodern role of the EU* (particularly that of the Western, postmodern part) between the two Arcs *is that of a buffer zone* (in our opinion), given that *the EU (as a political entity) does not want to assume a clear position in one of the two civilizational mega-systems,* which are currently taking shape, from the viewpoint of the

[6] Which opposes the area of Islamic civilization (defined as "*Dar-al-islam*") and other non-Christian European areas, in a symbolic sense.

civilizational paradigm. The EU can fall neither under the Eurasian Arc of Christianity, nor under the Transatlantic Arc of Christianity, for the simple reason that *according to its own treaties, the EU, as such, refuses to assume a clear civilizational identity, which would entail acknowledging its Christian origins*. On the other hand, *entities which fail to assume a clear civilizational identity in a global order of civilizations can only fall in a grey area, paradoxically*. It seems that the 21st century civilizational order will be *an order completely different from what the doctrine understands it to be*, an order with *clearly shaped* cultural areas *and with great civilizational powers to match, very clearly shaped, in order to be credible.* "Postmodernism" is not a clearly defined civilizational area; instead, it is *an alternative* to the traditional religious identities and it is an expression of the separation from such identities. However, the 21st century civilizational order is based on *clearly defined traditional religious concepts*, *structuring a world in which postmodernism no longer matters* (jihadism does not fight AGAINST postmodernism; we can say that jihadism simply occupies the place prepared by postmodernism, which also entails the rejection of the traditional European identity). It is a civilizational order *which stems from a civilizational-expansionist and belligerent movement* – terrorist Islamism – (seen by the Occidental world as an "offensive/expansive" movement or as a movement "with clear elements of anti-Occidental messages" – *of course, we refer to the more radical side of the Islamic civilization, not to the entire Islamic civilization).* We often notice this firm dimension in Trump's speeches, *a clear strategic and,* we can say, *global objective* (that of "intervention anywhere on the planet, to counter the danger of Islamist extremism"). *The entire restructuring of the 21st century international order stems from this strategic point (countering a radical-religious dimension, which belongs to a non-Occidental civilizational area).* Instead of abandoning this strategic point, the Trump Doctrine seems set *on strengthening it*, by *stating the objective* (even until the level *of transforming it in a "strategic priority"* for the US's external policy, in the Trump era, we could say) *to "counter Islamist terrorism anywhere on the planet"* (the global dimension of this strategic line). Plus, *other original elements* ("abandoning globalism" as a strategic doctrine, and by "globalism" we mean a "postmodern, post-Christian globalism", which cannot be applied to the "war among civilizations" paradigm, since it creates identity-based vulnerabilities, therefore security risks). There should be, however, a nuanced approach, *favourable to continuing American globalism, in terms of security*, *specifically on account of the global, unconventional nature of threats in the 21st century world ("…global leadership is a strategic imperative for America, not a favour that we do for other countries. It amplifies our voice and extends our reach")* (U.S. Department of State, n.d.).

- In Trump's Doctrine, the US seem tempted to *use certain strategic lines of globalism* (as inherited from the previous administrations) *and to restructure them.* I.e. the US plan to *re-use strategic partnerships with countries with a Christian historic-traditional identity, in order to build new concepts of their own vision of the 21st century world.* US, which see themselves as *a dominant power over the Christian civilizational area,* in the new order of civilizations, *convert their strategic partnerships into "pillars for Christian civilizational Arcs"*, not only in Europe but also in other regions of the world -*in a subsequent, advanced stage* of the Trump Doctrine consolidation (for example, by re-using the currently abandoned network of strategic partnerships with the states in the Asia-Pacific area, and by converting *certain* strategic partnerships in this area, into "pillars of a *Christian Civilizational Arc of the Asia-Pacific area*")-. The US are repositioning the new order of civilizations, at the beginning of the 21st century (as a paradigm open through the prioritization of "countering Islamist terrorism", as a strategic point in the Trump doctrine), *by applying the criterion adequate for this order (the civilizational, i.e. religious criterion*), when setting up *strategic regional structures*, which are able to *facilitate* the role of "dominant power" over the entire Christian civilizational area, as spread over the planet, for the US. However, this is only possible by building "Christian Civilizational Arcs" *comprising countries with strong Christian identities, which they assume, countries which are also strategic partners of the US.*

- *The US must assume an **active** civilizational role in the 21st century order of civilizations*[7]. A passive or negligent attitude would entail abandon or failure to smartly use certain strategic partnerships, which can only be activated based on the "*assumed civilizational*" criterion. For example, "a transatlantic partnership" (with a postmodern EU, which has renegated its Christian roots), inherited from a distinct geostrategic order (*postmodern* globalism) *would not react* into a civilizational order, if requested to take on the role of "Protector of the civilizational European-Christian area". This EU non-reaction would lead to weakening the role of the US, that of being "the dominant power over the entire Christian civilizational area", and the role of the "Transatlantic Arc of Christianity" (if the EU, as a postmodern entity, was part of this new strategic concept), this leading implicitly *to an expansion and consolidation of "the Eurasian Arc of Christianity"* (since countries from the Central and South-Eastern Europe would be tempted to draw near to and integrate in the rival concept of "Eurasian Arc of Christianity", where Russia

[7] *An implicit* strategic objective of the United States, by introducing the objective "to counter threats from different, non-Christian, non-Occidental areas", as a *strategic* security *objective* in the external policy.

would assume a leading position over "the Christian area" of Eurasian mega-civilization).

- *It also activates a dimension of civilizational cooperation*: the Trump Doctrine cannot be interpreted as a "conflictual doctrine *ab initio*", as a "generalized war against non-Christian civilizations". However, there is a common geostrategic line which, in our view, brings the two Geostrategic Arcs of Christianity closer, in which case *cooperation between the US and Russia, in the order of civilizations, as two dominant powers, with a common objective –countering Islamic terrorism-,* is a possible scenario (Tillerson, 2017). In a civilizational order, elements of closeness between the great civilizational powers (which clearly take on the role of promoter/defender of a civilizational area defined particularly through a traditional, historic and religious identity, *the Christian area*) should be identified. *There is a premise* for creating a dialog and cooperation framework (on civilizational subjects of common interest) (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2017) between the two powers, which have begun to take on the role of "dominant powers over Christian civilizational areas". A "clash of civilizations" paradigm is not necessarily a paradigm of "an inevitable conflict between Russia and the US", unlike resuming and applying the classic (already noted in history) "Cold War" paradigm.

Similar geostrategic visions, over time: an american diplomacy supporting the creation of a strategic partnership with Romania, Poland, as countries defending the christian civilizational area in Europe

In this context, it is interesting to mention what Lucian Orasel, historian and Republican stateman, stated in 2017, in Romania, at a TV political talk-show: the assertion that "the lack of strong anti-immigration policies under the Trump administration would have quickly led to turning America into a colony of globalization", with approximately 14 million immigrants currently in the US, especially from Mexico.

Lucian Orăşel emphasized that what lies at the centre of the Trump Doctrine (returning to a renewed and welcome form of "economic nationalism") is an "active policy to bring the American companies back home", and to stimulate reinvestments in the national economy, in order to revive America's economic force, which is considered "to be impacted by the costly policy of globalism".

Another line of diplomatic thinking approached by the Trump Doctrine, as described with that occasion, by Lucian Orăşel, is that of ignoring/abandoning globalist relationships (global agreements, relationships with integrationist entities, such as the EU) *and instead, stimulating bilateral and*

multilateral relationships, which are considered to be classic instruments of the Westphalian approach ("supporting the healthy external policy of a strong nation-state"). In this sense, the US external policy is less interested in having a direct relationship with the EU (as an entity as such), and *focusing instead on the bilateral diplomatic relations with the EU-member states*. Particular attention is paid to the strategic partnership with Romania *and to the bilateral relations with countries from the Central and South-Eastern Europe, which are strategic military and informational partners of the US*. From the viewpoint of the Trump Doctrine, as Lucian Orăşel described, "EU does not exist as a separate entity, as long as it does not have a president" (or it is not capable of taking a well-defined federative form, which would improve its credibility in relation to America). Paradoxically, the Trump administration rejects globalism, but demands that the EU become an authentic integrationist agreement (as an exponent of globalism), maybe even a strategic trap for EU[8] (since the US's priority to denounce global and integrationist agreements, and to reject globalist relationships is a known priority).

Another central principle of the Trump's Doctrine, as presented by Lucian Orăşel, is truly an *original element*, clearly distinct from other political doctrines in the entire post-1945 US history: adopting *an clear approach of fundamental re-organization of the entire international post-1945 system,* through new external policy implemented by the US, *and also, an approach of re-discussing all the constructions, institutions, agreements and their efficacy, if setup and operating between 1945 and 2017*. Such a key-point of the Trump Doctrine implicitly announced the support and opening of the US towards a clear and fundamental change with respect to all institutional organizations, the all political elites, to the domestic systems, as such, at the level of their strategic partners, countries which will be encouraged to adopt rapidly firm reforms and change of their inert and compromised systems and their whole obsolete "political class"[9].

[8] Starting from the statement of Lucian Orăşel that "the EU is just another version of the USSR", an idea probably inspired by V. Bukovski's work "*EU, another type of USSR?*", which would lead Europe to a "neo-cold war" paradigm ("an Atlantic-Westphalian bloc", and a "socialist-integrationist bloc").

[9] Trump doctrine announces an anti-bureaucratic movements and instead, is proposing a kind of civilization based on true human values and spirituality. In his speech in Poland/2017, President Trump says: "Finally, on both sides of the Atlantic, our citizens are confronted by yet another danger — one firmly within our control. *This danger is invisible to some but familiar to the Poles: the steady creep of government bureaucracy that drains the vitality and wealth of the people. The West became great not because of paperwork and regulations but because people were allowed to chase their dreams and pursue their destinies".* https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-people-poland

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Certain conclusions

Far from critiquing the Trump Doctrine merely because doing so would be "politically correct" or "in trend", we consider that it is necessary to reach a point of in-depth understanding and to analyse it seriously, since it is the doctrine of a political actor which has recently had the status of sole multi-dimensional world superpower, status which it still holds today, at least from the military and informational standpoint.

The Trump Doctrine is clearly designed to cope with *an ever changing* world, the early 21st century world. Moreover, we can say that the Trump Doctrine not only *adjusts* to change, but is also a doctrine *which drives change*, regarded here *as an in-depth reformation of an entire international system, from 1945 until the present day*, *as a system which no longer reflects the geostrategic realities of the 21st century*. This system would consume endless resources, money, while maintaining a world bureaucracy which is no longer justified, as Lucian Orasel asserted. Also known as a "doctrine of pragmatism", of "economic nationalism", of a daring "neo-realism", the Trump Doctrine is not, however, a doctrine of "conflict *ab initio*". Instead, it comprises sufficient elements of acceptance, cooperation and dialog with other large civilizations, which are able to build the new pillars of an international system entirely different from the current bureaucratized and inertial one.

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