Criminal Justice and Human Dignity: A European Perspective on the Limits of Punitive Power in Light of ECHR Jurisprudence

Abstract

          This paper investigates the relationship between criminal justice and human dignity in the context of European legal standards, with a particular focus on the limitations imposed on punitive power by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Against the backdrop of an evolving European human rights framework, the study examines how the principle of human dignity operates as a substantive constraint on state-sanctioned punishment. The paper is guided by the central thesis that dignity-based reasoning—grounded in Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment—has reshaped the contours of penal legitimacy within Council of Europe member states.  The methodology is primarily doctrinal, supported by case analysis and comparative legal reasoning. Key ECHR rulings—such as Tyrer v. United Kingdom, Vinter and Others v. United Kingdom, and M.S. v. Croatia—are examined to identify common principles limiting excessive or disproportionate punishment. The findings suggest that the ECHR has progressively elevated human dignity from a rhetorical ideal to an enforceable legal standard, influencing national criminal policies, prison conditions, and sentencing practices. While challenges persist regarding implementation and interpretive consistency, the Court’s jurisprudence marks a significant shift toward a humanistic and proportionate approach to criminal sanctioning. The study concludes that a dignity-centered penal system not only enhances compliance with European human rights law but also promotes a more just and resilient criminal justice framework.